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ABSTRACT
There has been considerable debate in the last decade about whether or not family planning programs
in developing countries reduce fertility or improve socioeconomic outcomes. This paper provides
new evidence on the role of contraceptive supply by exploiting the surprisingly haphazard expansion
of one of the world’s oldest and largest family planning organizations – PROFAMILIA of Colombia.
It finds that family planning  was  responsible for only 10% of the decline in fertility during
Colombia’s demographic transition. As in developed countries, however, lowering the costs of
postponing first births produced important socioeconomic gains, enabling young women to obtain
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“The goal is not reducing, increasing, or stabilizing the numbers of people.  It is 
helping make more possible a richer, fuller life – jobs; homes; resources; freedom 
from hunger, disease, ignorance; time for development of innate capacities – in short, 
enriching the quality of life for an increasing proportion of the world’s people.” 
 
– Leona Baumgartner, USAID, 1965   




Family planning programs have been a part of development agendas for nearly half a 
century.
2  Without access to modern contraceptives, the costliness of fertility control was 
historically thought to cause vicious cycles of high fertility, poverty, and economic stagnation 
(Ehrlich and Holdren 1971, Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990).  However, beliefs about the importance 
of family planning in development are at times stronger than the evidence that supports them.  In 
particular, because the placement and utilization of family planning programs are generally 
related to the demand for children, rigorous evaluations have proven to be difficult (Pritchett 
1994, Schultz 1994 and 2005).
3 
As this shortcoming has become better recognized, a very different view has gained 
prominence in the last decade: development simply causes women to want fewer children, and 
the true effect of contraceptive supply on fertility is quantitatively unimportant (even if large 
reductions in fertility are achieved with modern contraceptives) (Pritchett 1994, Bongaarts 1994, 
Dasgupta 1995).  This controversial demand-oriented view requires either (a) that the demand for 
                                                 
1 USAID has been a principal supporter of PROFAMILIA. 
2 Family planning programs are a bundle of services that generally aim to reduce the costs of fertility control.  They 
typically include the provision of contraceptive services and devices as well as reproductive education. 
3 Even the results of the famous Matlab family planning experiment (Phillips et. al. 1988, Koenig et. al. 1992, Foster 
and Roy 1997, Sinha, 2003) have been called into question.  First, there is new evidence that true randomization was 
not achieved (Joshi and Schultz 2005).  Second, the family planning treatment was too expensive to be financially 
sustainable without considerable external support – program expenditures per fertile women and per averted birth 
were roughly 10% and 120% of per capita GDP (thirty-five times more than mean family planning spending per 
capita in other Asian countries at the time) (Pritchett 1994).  Third, health services were integrated into the family 
planning treatment four years after the experiment began, making it difficult to isolate the consequences of family 
planning.   2 
children very price inelastic, or (b) that the costs of fertility control are small or are not shifted 
much by family planning.  Although price elasticity of demand for children is not well 
established, both experience with HIV/AIDS prevention and empirical research on intra-
household bargaining suggest that the costs of fertility control may be large in the absence of 
modern contraceptives.
4  Moreover, debate about family planning and lifetime fertility often 
overlooks other important dimensions of fertility and well-being emphasized in wealthy country 
studies – the timing of first births and human capital accumulation, for example (Angrist and 
Evans 1998, Goldin and Katz 2002, Miller 2005, Bailey 2006). 
In this paper, I provide new evidence on the role of contraceptive supply in development 
drawn from one of the world’s oldest and largest family planning organizations – PROFAMILIA 
of Colombia (Asociacion Pro-Bienestar de la Familia Colombiana).  PROFAMILIA was founded 
in 1965 under an informal political compromise and became the country’s dominant family 
planning provider for thee decades.  Several key features of its programs allow me to address the 
difficulties of previous research: their massive country-wide coverage, their duration over several 
decades, their financial sustainability, and their remarkably haphazard geographic spread.  This 
last feature provides variation in contraceptive supply not related to demand.  Figure 1 provides 
suggestive evidence of PROFAMILIA' s impact.  Fertility declined more abruptly in Colombia 
than in any other South American country over any period of time precisely as it was scaling-up 
its operations during the late 1960s and early 1970s.   
PROFAMILIA was founded during a period of unprecedented social and economic 
change in Colombia, so an empirical strategy capable of isolating its impact is critical.  Because 
                                                 
4 The challenges of HIV/AIDS prevention suggest little deviation from desired sexual activity even if the 
consequences are grave (Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi 2003, United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS 2004).  Women 
in developing countries also thought to have relatively little bargaining power within households (Thomas 1990 and 
1994, Case and Deaton 1998, Pitt and Khandker 1998, Duflo 2003, Rangel 2004), so negotiating sexual activity and 
fertility choices with men may be quite costly.   3 
the introduction of its programs varied across municipalities and over time, variation in 
contraceptive access among women of the same age in different municipalities and among 
women of slightly different ages in the same municipality can be combined to estimate family 
planning effects.  Other studies have used similar approaches, but they have generally found that 
programs were established in response to changes in need or prosperity (i.e., demand) 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1986, Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons 1993, Gertler and Molyneaux 
1994).
5  This does not appear to be the case with PROFAMILIA. 
I first investigate the effects of family planning on lifetime fertility.  My findings suggest 
that the availability of modern contraceptives allowed women to postpone their first birth and to 
reduce their completed lifetime fertility by 6% to 13% (two-fifths to three-quarters of a child).  
However, these estimates explain only about 10% of the fertility decline in program areas 
between 1964 and 1993, suggesting other factors (although not necessarily demand-side factors) 
to be more important determinants of women’s lifetime fertility. 
Next, I estimate program effects on women’s socio-economic status.  Women with access 
to family planning at all fertile ages received nearly 0.15 more years of schooling, were more 
likely to work in the formal sector, and were less likely to live with male partners.  Comparisons 
with other well-regarded development interventions suggest that these effects may place family 
planning among the most effective interventions to foster human capital formation.  The age 
pattern of results also implies that delayed first births rather than reduced lifetime fertility was 
primarily responsible for these socio-economic gains.  This finding is important because the 
                                                 
5 This study builds on a large literature investigating the broader inter-relationships between fertility and socio-
economic well-being in both developed and developing countries as exemplified by Becker (1960), Becker and 
Lewis (1973), Willis (1973), Schultz (1974), Easterlin (1978), Easterlin, Pollak, and Wachter (1980), Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin (1980), Cain (1981), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1986), Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons (1993), Gertler 
and Molyneaux (1994), Foster and Roy (1997), Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997), Schultz (1997), Angrist and 
Evans (1998), Gruber, Levine, and Staiger (1999), Donohue and Levitt (2001), Goldin and Katz (2002), Sinha 
(2003), Joshi and Schultz (2005), Miller (2005), Bailey (2006), and Pop-Eleches (2006).    4 
development literature generally emphasizes completed lifetime fertility and child quantity more 
than the lifecycle timing of births.   
Six types of evidence address the natural – but seemingly unfounded – concern that the 
spread of PROFAMILIA’s programs was related to secular changes in fertility, socio-economic 
conditions, or the demand for children.  First, through in-person interviews, PROFAMILIA’s 
early leaders explained that they consider program expansion to have been arbitrary and 
unrelated to demand conditions.  Second, raw population census data shows identical completed 
lifetime fertility among women too old to benefit from family planning (both in level and trend) 
across municipalities with differentially-timed programs – and staggered fertility declines among 
younger women that coincide precisely with the introduction of modern contraceptives.  Third, 
municipal characteristics in 1964 (the year before PROFAMILIA was established) are unrelated 
to the timing of municipal family planning programs.  Fourth, implicit program targeting would 
be evident as program effects among women outside of the biologically-determined ages at 
which family planning should matter.  Statistical analyses demonstrate the absence of any effects 
at these ages.  Fifth, because family planning did not influence women’s decision to become 
mothers, programs targeted to demand conditions among young women would be evident as 
education or labor force participation effects among women with access to family planning at 
young ages but never having a child.  Analyses confirm the absence of program effects in this 
control group of women.  Finally, all estimates are robust to controlling for fixed and age-
varying differences among women across Colombia' s municipalities. 
This paper is organized in eight sections.  The second section provides background on 
family planning in Latin America and on PROFAMILIA in Colombia.  The third describes my 
data and presents graphical analyses, and the fourth details my empirical strategy.  The fifth   5 
section reports the paper’s main results, the sixth presents a variety of validity tests, and the 
seventh extends the analyses to children' s socio-economic outcomes and inequality.  The eighth 
section concludes. 
 
2. PROFAMILIA and Family Planning in Latin America 
2.1 The Evolution of Family Planning in Latin America 
The prevailing government philosophy in Latin America during the 1950s and early 
1960s was strongly pronatalist, as exemplified by the motto “gobernar es poblar,” or “to govern 
is to populate” (Mundigo 1996).  Nation-building required a large body of citizens to create 
international standing as well as deep consumer markets and a large workforce.  Rather than 
concern about an imminent Malthusian ‘population explosion’ that would result in mass 
starvation, it was the alarming incidence of unsafe abortions that first led Latin American 
governments to take interest in family planning in the mid-1960s.  Abortions performed in 
unsanitary conditions by unqualified personnel were certainly troubling in their own right (they 
were thought to have been the leading cause of maternal mortality at the time).  But they also 
resulted in large government expenses as women with abortion-related complications sought care 
en masse from public hospitals (Mundigo 1996).  
As Latin American governments began warming up to family planning, they faced 
daunting opposition to their direct involvement from the Catholic Church and other conservative 
elements.  Consequently, early family planning efforts in Latin America were small, private 
initiatives funded by international donors and NGOs.
6  Over time, growing awareness of family 
                                                 
6 The major organizations involved were the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).   6 
planning as a health input allowed governments to incorporate it into their public health systems.  
The prolonged dominance of private family planning services in Colombia was uncommon. 
 
2.2 PROFAMILIA and the Introduction of Family Planning in Colombia 
In Colombia, the National Association of Medical Schools was the early leader on 
population issues (Ott 1977).  It conducted the first fertility surveys and introduced reproductive 
health training into the medical curriculum, but intense political pressure forced it not to sponsor 
the provision of contraceptive services and devices.  The national government faced similar 
political constraints, but importantly, it also chose not to actively oppose private family planning 
efforts. 
The government’s tacit acceptance of private initiatives paved the way for the 
establishment of the private, not-for-profit PROFAMILIA.  Its founder, Dr. Fernando Tamayo, 
was a young obstetrician/gynecologist working in a public hospital in Bogota at the time who 
also had a small private practice on this side.  When he began quietly providing contraceptive 
devices (primarily IUDs at first) through his practice, the clinic’s capacity was quickly 
overwhelmed by the enormous latent demand for them.  Poor women waited in long lines that 
spilled into the streets, upsetting more affluent patients and causing his practice partners to 
complain.  Rather than turn these women away, he instead sought a new clinic location, resulting 
in the birth of PROFAMILIA in 1965.
7   
Because of the political quagmire surrounding family planning, PROFAMILIA was the 
dominant family planning provider in Colombia for many years after its inception.
8  Its 
                                                 
7 The new location first chosen had to be abandoned when the landlord discovered how the space was being used, 
reportedly exclaiming: “I don’t mind if it is used as a whorehouse, but I will not allow it to be used for family 
planning!” (Singh 1994) 
8 As late as 1990, PROFAMILIA still provided about 70% of all family planning services in Colombia.   7 
operations spread to all of Colombia’s significant municipalities in subsequent years, growing 
into a network of 40 municipal program areas over the next decade.  Simultaneously, the 
contraceptive prevalence among married Colombian women of reproductive age rose from a 
negligible rate in 1964 to 19% in 1969, 34% in 1976, and 53% in 1986.  Oral contraceptives and 
IUDs were the most popular devices in the early years.  Over time, however, female sterilization 
has become the most common form of birth control. 
PROFAMILIA’s international reputation of success was built on the new ways it 
pioneered to reach women with modern contraceptives under difficult circumstances.  
Distinguishing features of its philosophy include its focus on the poor and its recruitment of lay-
people to provide outreach in their own communities.  In municipalities where it operated, 
PROFAMILIA also supplied vast quantities of contraceptive devices not requiring medical 
supervision to local drugstores at cost, and it advertised its services by radio.  In 1971, 
PROFAMILIA became the first family planning organization in Latin America to serve rural 
areas as well.   
Figure 1 shows that the demographic transition in Colombia does not resemble the 
transition in other South American countries.  The fertility decline in Colombia during the late 
1960s and early 1970s (when PROFAMILIA was expanding) was the most rapid decline on 
record in South America, and Colombia was not developing more rapidly than its neighbors over 
this decade.  A rough comparison with Venezuela is informative.  Venezuela is geographically 
adjacent to Colombia, shares much of its colonial history, experienced a similar shift from 
natural resource exports to industrialization in the post-war era, and had comparably high fertility 
rates during the late 1950s and early 1960s.  However, its privately-funded family planning 
programs established during the 1960s failed to take root, and its public sector family planning   8 
activities languished for several decades (Parrado 2000).  From 1960-65 to 1985-90, fertility fell 
by about 3.5 children per woman in Colombia and about 2.75 children per woman in Venezuela 
– a difference of 0.75 children.  This admittedly crude difference-in-difference closely matches 
the family planning effects that I estimate more formally using within-country variation in 
PROFAMILIA' s location and timing. 
 
2.3 The Spread of PROFAMILIA’s Programs 
Critical to the empirical strategy of this paper is the way that PROFAMILIA’s programs 
spread across Colombia’s municipalities.  Because the precise timing of PROFAMILIA’s 
programs across municipalities is assumed to be largely exogenous, it is important to investigate 
any regularity governing the timing and placement of its programs.  One of PROFAMILIA’s 
leaders during the 1960s and 1970s, Dr. Gonzalo Echeverry, explained to me that he considers 
the timing of municipal programs across Colombia to essentially have been arbitrary.  After 
being established in Colombia’s two largest cities (Bogota and Medellin), PROFAMILIA spread 
to many small departmental capitals like Sogamoso, Armero, and Puerto Berrio before reaching 
other major cities like Cali, Cartagena, and Santa Marta.  Program expansion also did not follow 
any clear geographic pattern.  For example, a program began in the coastal city of Barranquilla in 
1967, but none was established either in nearby Cartagena or Santa Marta until 1970 and 1972 
(respectively). 
These observations do not preclude the possibility of implicit program targeting 
according to demand conditions.  However, regressions of program dates on municipal 
characteristics in 1964 (the year before PROFAMILIA was established) yield no evidence of   9 
meaningful relationships.
9  Section 7 presents a wider range of more strenuous validity tests to 
detect implicit targeting related to changes in demand (not just the level of demand) – including 
changes in age-specific demand conditions among fertile women.  These tests provide robust 
evidence in support of the identifying assumption. 
 
3. Data and Graphical Analysis 
3.1 Data 
Because there is no longitudinal data on Colombian households from the 1960s and 
1970s, this study requires that women from different municipalities and birth cohorts be matched 
to information on the timing and location of PROFAMILIA’s programs.  In this study, I make 
extensive use of the Colombian population censuses.  The Colombian national statistical agency 
(Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica, or DANE) conducted censuses that 
asked questions about the number of children ever born and the number of children surviving in 
1973, 1985, and 1993.  To create large samples of women who ranged from not yet fertile to no 
longer fertile when PROFAMILIA was established in 1965, random samples of approximately 
one million women born between 1911 and 1955 are used throughout this paper.
10  I rely 
primarily on the 1993 census because it allows me to investigate long-run outcomes and to 
exploit considerable variation in access to family planning among women with complete fertility 
histories.  I also use the 1973 census to investigate the relationship between family planning 
                                                 
9 Characteristics examined in the 1964 population census include municipal population and residents’ age, sex, 
marital status, relationship to the household head, migration history since birth, literacy, employment status, and 
work history in the past year.  Because PROFAMILIA began in Colombia’s two largest cities, Bogota and Medellin, 
program dates are correlated with population size in unavariate regressions (p<0.05), but this correlation disappears 
when these two cities are excluded and in multivariate regressions that include the other characteristics.  This 
paper’s primary results shown in Tables 2 through 4 are robust to the exclusion of women from Bogota and 
Medellin.  All results not shown are available upon request.  
10 The results are not sensitive to the particular draw used.   10 
access and the timing of first births (which is not explicitly reported).  Table 1 shows descriptive 
statistics from these samples.   
Age-specific family planning access that varied by year of birth and place of residence 
(or birth) was assigned to individual women in these census samples using information from 
PROFAMILIA’s research department on the timing and location of its programs.
11  Because of 
uncertainty about when many rural programs began, this paper focuses on municipal program 
which covered about 40% of Colombia’s population.  Following the demography literature, I 
define women’s reproductive ages to be 15-44 and create five-year age intervals (15-19, 20-24, 
etc.) for all reproductive ages.  Dummy variables code each woman' s reproductive age interval 
when a family planning program began in her municipality of residence.
12 
 
3.2 Graphical Analysis 
Before turning to more formal analyses, I first present graphical evidence of the 
relationship between PROFAMILIA’s programs and lifetime fertility.  This evidence also 
supports the assumption that program placement and timing was not related to changes in the 
demand for children.  Figure 2 plots average completed fertility among all women ever having 
children by year of birth in the 1993 population census.
13  Because cohort-specific fertility is 
difficult to illustrate separately for each municipality, I divide these municipalities into two 
groups: those with family planning programs before 1969 (“early” program municipalities), and 
those with programs in 1969 or later (“late” program municipalities).
14   
                                                 
11 This information is available upon request: ngmiller@stanford.edu. 
12 I choose dummy variables because not all individuals appear to know their precise birth year.  Similar results are 
obtained when age at first access to family planning is coded using women’s municipality of birth.    
13 The same patterns are found using all women. 
14 1969 is the population-weighted median year that PROFAMILIA' s programs began in these municipalities.   11 
The figure first shows that among women too old to benefit from family planning (those 
born before 1920, who were 45+ when PROFAMILIA was established in 1965), there were no 
differences in either fertility levels or trends across areas with differentially-timed programs.  
Then, among women late in their fertile years when PROFAMILIA was founded (those born 
between 1920 and 1930, who were 35-45 in 1965), fertility in the early program municipalities 
pulls slightly below fertility in the late ones.  This divergence between early and late areas 
becomes much more pronounced among women born in 1930 or later (who were 35 or younger 
in 1965).  Among women just becoming fertile when PROFAMILIA was established (those born 
in 1950 or just before 1950), the amount of time it took fertility in late program municipalities to 
catch up to fertility in the early ones (the horizontal distance between the early and late program 
series) is three to four years.  Strikingly, this is exactly the difference in time between the 
average early group program and the average late group program.  The two fertility series then 
re-converge among younger women having access to family planning at all fertile ages 
regardless of where they live (women born around 1965 or later).
15  This convergence should not 
be complete because a few municipalities in the late group did not have programs until the 
1980s.  The younger birth cohorts also reflect intergenerational program effects because they 
include the daughters of women who had varying access to modern contraceptives.   
To see the age and timing of program effects more clearly, Figure 3 shows average 
completed fertility by age at first access to family planning.  After removing cohort effects, age 
when programs were introduced is negatively related to completed lifetime fertility.
16  More 
precisely, this association is present at fertile ages from the mid-teens through the mid-30s and 
                                                 
15 Women born in the early 1950s or later were still fertile at the time of the 1993 census, so their fertility should not 
be interpreted as completed lifetime fertility. 
16 Figure 3 was produced by regressing lifetime fertility on birth cohort dummy variables and then plotting the 
residuals by age at first access to family planning (and scaling them by lifetime fertility among women age 50-54 in 
1965).   12 
absent at infertile ages.  Figure 3 shows that access to family planning at all fertile ages is 
associated with a completed lifetime fertility reduction of about 0.75 children controlling only 
for cohort effects.  This reduction very closely matches statistical estimates that I present later. 
Figures 2 and 3 show clear evidence that PROFAMILIA' s programs were associated with 
lower fertility rates.  They also support the assumption that program placement and timing was 
not related to the demand for children.  Pre-program levels correlated with program timing 
would be evident in Figure 2 among women born before 1920, and pre-program trends correlated 
with program timing would be evident in Figure 3 among women first exposed to family 
planning at infertile ages. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Fertility 
This paper presents reduced-form estimates of family planning' s consequences by 
exploiting the distinct timing, geographic pattern, and age-specific nature of PROFAMILIA' s 
programs.  Unobserved individual characteristics presumably influence the use of contraceptive 
services and devices, so program effects identified by variation in utilization would be biased.  
For this reason, the effects of family planning access are estimated rather than the effects of 
contraceptive use. 
A simple approach would be to compare the fertility of women who are the same age but 
live in different municipalities and therefore differ in access to family planning.  However, 
municipalities with differentially-timed programs could vary in fertility for reasons unrelated to 
family planning (although Figures 2 and 3 suggest that this was not the case).  An alternative   13 
would be to compare the fertility of different aged women in the same municipality.  In this case, 
program effects could not be disentangled from cohort effects. 
To circumvent these difficulties, I combine the two approaches, using only joint variation 
in the timing and location of PROFAMILIA' s programs to identify their age-specific effects.  In 
doing so, I assume that the combination of variation in contraceptive access across municipalities 
and over time is exogenous.  This implies that women the same age in municipalities with 
differentially-timed programs would have experienced the same changes in fertility over time in 
the absence of family planning.  It also implies that after controlling for age, fertility differences 
between younger and older women in the same municipality are attributable only to family 
planning.  Section 7 devotes considerable attention to evaluating the validity of the identifying 
assumption. 
I focus on two distinct lifetime fertility choices that contraceptive access could affected: 
whether or not to have children and how many births to have conditional on having any.
17  A 
two-part empirical model allows family planning effects to differ for these two choices.  This 
approach is also one way of handling censoring at zero in the distribution of births.  For 
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17 The former provides a means of investigating the timing of first births, too, as discussed in Section 6.1.   14 
In these simple specifications, the choices of ever having a child (b) and the number of births (n) 
are assumed to depend on a constant, the reproductive age interval (r) in which PROFAMILIA’s 
programs first became available to woman i (15-19, 20-24, ..., 40-44), and birth year dummies 
(￿y); ￿ represents the standard normal cumulative density function.  By controlling only for year 
of birth, these equations estimate program effects as if the location and timing of 
PROFAMILIA' s programs were randomized. The ￿s and ￿s are estimates of family planning 
effects for women first exposed to family planning in each reproductive age interval (15-19, 20-
24, ..., 40-44).
18  The interpretation of the ￿s would be more complicated if I found that family 
planning affected the decision to have children (if the ￿s￿0), but as shown in section 6, this is not 
the case.  I next re-estimate these equations including additional independent variables: 
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Equations (3) and (4) also include municipality dummy variables (￿m), municipality-specific 
linear time trends (￿m×y), and a dummy variables indicating whether or not a woman has ever 
moved (g).  If joint variation in the location and timing of PROFAMILIA' s programs was truly 
exogenous, the age-specific program effect estimates from equations 3 and 4 should not be 
different than those obtained from 1 and 2. 
                                                 
18 A dummy variable is included for the age range 10-14 as well, and its coefficient estimate is indistinguishable 
from the one on age range 15-19.  I also include a dummy variable for age range 45-49, as discussed in Section 7 
under Validity Tests.  The omitted age-range is 50-54.   15 
The logarithmic transformation of births in equations 2 and 4 is reasonable given its 
right-skewed distribution (conditional on any births).
19  However, count data models also fit the 
distribution of births well.  In particular, negative binomial models provide an attractive 
alternative and are more appropriate than poisson models in instances of unequal mean and 
variance given their flexible dispersion parameter (Cameron and Trivedi 1998).
20  For this 
reason, both log-linear program effect estimates and negative binomial estimates are presented 
side-by-side in the Results section.   
 
4.2 Socio-Economic Status 
To estimate the consequences of contraceptive access for women’s socio-economic 
status, I employ reduced-form approaches as shown in equations 3 and 4.  A variety of socio-
economic outcomes are used as dependent variables: women’s years of educational attainment, 
dichotomous indicators for formal sector employment and “white collar” occupations 
(conditional on working in the formal sector), cohabitation, and self-reported infant/child 
mortality.
21  I rely exclusively on a reduced-form approach because family planning may affect 
socio-economic outcomes through pathways other than completed lifetime fertility.  For 
example, I present evidence in Section 6.1 that family planning influenced the timing of births as 
                                                 
19 Retransformation back to the raw scale is problematic when the error term is heteroskedastic across treatment 
groups (Manning 1998, Buntin and Zaslavsky 2004).  However, regressions of log squared residuals on age-specific 
program exposure suggest that this is not problematic in my case. 
20 In the terminology of Cameron and Trivedi (1998), I specifically use a NB2 model where the dependent variable y 
is assumed to have mean ￿=exp(X￿) and variance ￿+￿￿
2 (where X is a vector of independent variables): 
( ) ( )






























, .  Estimates of the dispersion parameter ￿ range from 0.04 to 0.10 and are 
statistically different from zero at conventional levels, suggesting the presence of modest overdispersion. 
21 Formal sector employment is defined as working for an establishment with three or more employees.  “White 
collar” occupations were coded from a list of occupations to distinguish clerical and office-based jobs from manual 
labor.  Cohabitation is defined here as either marriage or an extra-marital “free-union.”  Infant/child mortality is 
defined as the difference between a woman’s reported number of lifetime births and reported number of surviving 
children divided by her reported number of lifetime births.   16 
well as the number of births.  The exclusion restriction required to instrument for completed 
lifetime fertility using family planning access is therefore probably not met. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Fertility Results 
Tables 2 and 3 present estimates of how age-specific access to family planning affected 
women' s fertility choices.  Dependent variables are shown at the top of the columns, and cells 
within columns show the association between first having access to family planning within a 
given age-range (15-19, 20-24, etc.) and the corresponding fertility outcome.  The first column 
for each dependent variable generally provides program effect estimates conditional only on 
cohort dummy variables (“Cohort Only”).  The second column for each dependent variable 
generally shows estimates conditional on the full set of covariates (“All Covariates”).  These 
specifications include municipality fixed-effects and municipality-specific linear trends exactly 
as shown in equations 3 and 4.  I emphasize the results obtained using the larger set of covariates 
but highlight that the estimates are robust to controlling for fixed and time-varying differences 
across municipalities.  The statistical equivalence of estimates obtained using different sets of 
covariates supports the assumption that the spread of family planning was largely exogenous. 
The first and second columns of Table 2 show log-linear program effect estimates for 
lifetime fertility among women ever having a child (the second part of the two-part model as 
shown in equations 2 and 4).  Because the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, coefficient 
estimates can roughly be interpreted as percent changes in lifetime births associated with first 
having access to family planning in each age interval.  In general, gaining access to 
PROFAMILIA' s programs was negatively associated with lifetime fertility for women in their   17 
late teens through their early thirties.  Relative to women without family planning access while 
fertile, lifetime access was associated with about 13% fewer births (the estimate for “Family 
Planning Access 15-19”).  From a base of six births, this reduction is equivalent to about three-
quarters of a child.  Lifetime fertility effects are progressively smaller for women who were older 
when modern contraceptives became available.  Women first exposed to family planning at ages 
30-34 had about 4% fewer children, and no program effects are evident among women first 
exposed at age 35 or beyond. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 show comparable negative binomial estimates.  
Although somewhat smaller than the log-linear estimates in the first two columns, these 
estimates tell the same story.
22  Women ages 15-19 when family planning programs began gave 
birth to about 7% fewer children in their lifetime (or about 0.4 children).  Program effects are 
again present among women first exposed to family planning at ages up to their early thirties. 
The first two columns of Table 3 show program effect estimates from the first part of the 
two-part model (equations 1 and 3) for women' s decision ever to have children.  Among women 
with completed fertility, they show no evidence that access to family planning at any age is 
associated with the choice to become a mother.  These point estimates that are very near zero are 
precisely estimated.  Combining estimates from both parts of the model, PROFAMILIA' s 
programs explain between 9% and 12% of the fertility decline in program municipalities 
between 1964 and 1993. 
Although the Colombian population censuses do not report the year of women' s births, 
the result that family planning did not influence the decision ever to have children provides a 
way of investigating program effects on the timing of first births.  The 1973 census was 
                                                 
22 The negative binomial model produces a slightly larger log-likelihood value than the maximum likelihood 
equivalent of the log-linear OLS model.   18 
conducted shortly after PROFAMILIA established programs in many areas, and young women 
exposed to programs in these areas still had many fertile years ahead of them.  Program effects 
on whether or not young women had children at the time of the 1973 census can therefore be 
interpreted as effects on the timing of first births.  The third column of Table 3 presents estimates 
from the 1973 census comparable to those from the 1993 census shown in the second column.  
The major difference is that women gaining access to family planning in their late teens were 
about 3% less likely to be mothers in 1973.  This result suggests that PROFAMILIA' s programs 
allowed women ages 15-19 to postpone their first birth.  Because this estimate only captures first 
births postponed from before until after 1973 census was conducted, the magnitude of delayed 
first births is presumably much larger. 
 
5.2 Socio-Economic Results for Women 
Table 4 shows results for women’s socio-economic status among women ever having 
children (and whose fertility changed under family planning).  Each column shows estimates for 
a different socio-economic outcome with the dependent variable at the top of the column.  The 
first column presents program effect estimates for years of education.  Relative to women 
without access to family planning while fertile, women ages 15 to 19 when PROFAMILIA 
established a program completed 0.14 more years of schooling.  From a base of slightly less than 
7 years of schooling, this is an increase of more than 2%.  There is also weaker evidence that 
women first exposed to family planning in their early twenties completed more schooling as 
well.  In general, these are large effects that could be due to the postponement of first births, 
reductions in completed lifetime fertility, or both.  The absence of meaningful effects among   19 
fertile women just beyond school age provides additional support for the assumption that family 
planning program placement was unrelated to the demand for children.
23 
The second column of Table 4 shows that family planning access at young ages was 
associated with greater probabilities of working in the formal sector in 1993.  Women first 
exposed to family planning at ages 15-19 and 20-24 were 3 percentage points more likely to be 
working.  These gains represent increases of 5% in the probability of formal sector employment.  
However, because the censuses only report employment in the formal sector, it is possible that 
these estimates also capture occupational choice effects.  Shifts from informal to formal sector 
work would be combined with increases in employment.   The third column shows no evidence 
that conditional on formal sector employment, women were not more likely to have “white 
collar” or professional occupations because of family planning access. 
The fourth column of Table 4 shows that access to family planning under age 25 reduced 
the probability that women were cohabitating in 1993 (either married or in an extra-marital “free-
union”).  Women 15-19 and 20-24 when PROFAMILIA established a program were about 2 
percentage points less likely to be cohabitating in 1993, a reduction of about 3%.  The welfare 
consequences of cohabitation are more ambiguous than for other socio-economic outcomes 
considered in this paper; even the direction of the effect may depend on the circumstances.  For 
example, there may be gains from specialization in household production (Becker 1981, 
Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997, Pollak 2005), but women with little bargaining power within 
households (and their children) may do better by living independently as women’s labor market 
opportunities improve.   
                                                 
23 Five-year undergraduate degrees are generally terminal, even among the elite.  Some limited masters-level 
training also occurs.   20 
Finally, the last column shows no evidence that family planning affected self-reported 
infant and child mortality.  The point estimates corresponding to first being exposed to family 
planning in each age interval are very close to zero, and they are precisely estimated.  However, 
measurement error is likely more problematic for self-reported infant and child mortality.  These 
inaccuracies could be correlated with family planning access, or they could simply result 
classical measurement error; the sign of the potential bias is unclear.  Changes in the composition 
of births could also be relevant.  Because first-born children are generally more likely to die, 
lower age-specific infant and child mortality rates could be offset as first births grow as a share 
of total births (Bongaarts 1987).  Nevertheless, the absence of detectable family planning effects 
stands in stark contrast to the common belief that the number and timing of births are important 
determinants of infant mortality (Wolpin 1997). 
It is noteworthy that all statistically meaningful socio-economic effects shown in Table 4 
occur among women who first had access to modern contraceptives at young ages.  Although 
Table 2 shows that gaining access to family planning was associated with lower completed 
lifetime fertility among women up to age 35, Table 4 reports essentially no socio-economic 
program effects past age 24.  The close correspondence between ages at which first births were 
postponed and ages at which socio-economic benefits occurred suggests that the timing of first 
births may be a more important determinant of socio-economic outcomes than completed 
lifetime fertility. 
 
6. Validity Tests 
This section examines the identifying assumption of exogenous joint program placement 
and timing in detail and then investigates other possible concerns about the confounding   21 
influence of migration, selective attrition due to differential mortality, incomplete fertility 
histories, and contamination.   
 The graphical evidence in Section 4 suggests that joint variation in program location and 
timing is exogenous, but this assumption can be evaluated statistically, too.  One approach is to 
test for program effects on any outcome among women outside of the biologically-determined 
ages at which they should benefit from family planning (ages 45-49, for example).  This is 
similar to testing for relative changes in fertility or markers related to the demand for children 
(such as education and labor force participation) just before programs were established (as would 
be possible in panel data).  Effects at these ages would suggest that the estimates presented in 
Tables 2 through 4 mistakenly capture either pre-existing trends in fertility or socio-economic 
status or mean reversion.  Tables 2 through 4 show the absence of program effects at ages 45-49 
for all fertility and socio-economic outcomes available in the population censuses.  Table 5 
shows results obtained by re-estimated equations 3 and 4 for fertility and socio-economic 
outcomes using the entire census population of women ages 45-49 and 50-54 when family 
planning programs began.  Doing so follows the logic of estimating program effects for women 
ages 45-49 in Tables 2 and 4 but has even greater power to detect meaningful differences from 
zero.  For educational attainment, I conduct this test for women just past schooling age (25-29) 
relative to women five years older (30-34).  Table 5 shows no evidence of program effects on 
any outcome at these ages.  Comparisons among successively older age groups of women (not 
shown) also yield precise estimates that are indistinguishable from zero. 
Another important way to test the identifying assumption is to test for program effects at 
all ages among women who never had children.  Because family planning did not affect women' s 
decisions to become mothers, women the same age and in the same municipalities but who never   22 
gave birth form a reasonable control group for women with children.  Importantly, this test 
allows me to detect confounding secular socio-economic trends that are specific to any cohort by 
municipality cell of women.  The additional benefit of this test over the ones presented in the 
previous paragraph is that it can detect program targeting specific to changing demand 
conditions among young women (the ones most likely to benefit from family planning).  Table 6 
shows age-specific program effects obtained by re-estimating equations 3 and 4 for socio-
economic outcomes among women who never had a child – there is no evidence of any program 
effect at any age on any socio-economic outcome among these women.
24  Taken together, the 
validity tests presented thus far imply that if there were any confounding force responsible for 
this paper’s major findings, it must have varied in a very specific way – across municipalities 
and over time in the same pattern as PROFAMILIA’s programs, only affecting women at 
biologically plausible ages within each municipality, and only affecting women who ever 
became mothers.  This possibility seems quite unlikely.  In particular, the tendency of programs 
to have been established somewhat earlier in larger municipalities does not appear to reflect 
differentially-changing demand conditions. 
In addition to the validity of the identifying assumption, there are also other potential 
objections that should be addressed.  One is the possibility of selection due to unobserved 
migration.  By influencing socio-economic conditions, the establishment of family planning 
programs might have non-randomly attracted women from surrounding areas.  There was in fact 
unprecedented migration from rural to urban areas during the period studied; about 15% of 
individuals in the 1993 census had moved during the last five years, and nearly 40% had moved 
in their lifetime (although not necessarily to a different municipality).  Because family planning 
                                                 
24 About 15% of women in the sample never had a child.  Larger draws of women never giving birth confirm that 
the absence of statistical significance in Table 6 is not due to sample size.   23 
access was governed by age and municipality of residence, unobserved migration could possibly 
bias the estimates presented.  However, several pieces of evidence suggest that this paper’s major 
findings are not due to selection acting through migration.  First, the estimates shown in Tables 2 
through 4 are not sensitive to conditioning on migration history (ever having moved).  Second, 
although movers and never-movers may differ in unobserved ways, Table 1 suggests that their 
observable characteristics are very similar.  Third, Table 7 shows that re-estimating equations 3 
and 4 in a restricted sample of women who have never moved yields the same pattern of results 
as shown in Tables 2 through 4.  Finally, coding family planning access according to 
municipality of birth rather than municipality of residence (not shown) also yields the same 
general pattern of results. 
Another concern might be the possibility of selective attrition.  If family planning altered 
women’s survival rates (by resulting in fewer unsafe abortions, for example), it would also alter 
the composition of women across municipalities in the censuses, biasing program effect 
estimates.  Colombia’s low-quality vital statistics from the 1960s and 1970s make it difficult to 
investigate this possibility directly.  However, the direction of any selective attrition bias is most 
likely downward.  Poor women are disproportionately likely to seek unsafe abortions.  Because 
abortions and modern contraceptives are presumably substitutes, poor women would therefore 
have higher survival rates in municipalities with earlier family planning programs.  So poor 
women would comprise a larger share of all women in municipalities with earlier programs, and 
poor women have higher fertility rates, earlier first births, and worse socio-economic indicators 
on average.  Any selective attrition would therefore most likely result in downward bias. 
Finally, although the municipalities examined by this paper are not geographically 
contiguous, a potential concern might be that PROFAMILIA' s programs benefited areas other   24 
than the municipalities in which they were based.  This possibility is unlikely.  Colombia is 
environmentally diverse, and most of its major population centers are separated by hostile 
mountainous stretches of the Andes.  Colombians will readily attest that geographic distance and 
travel time in much of the country are virtually unrelated to each other.  It is therefore difficult to 
imagine that modern contraceptives reached areas other than those immediately served by 
PROFAMILIA’s programs.  In the unlikely event that they did, however, the resulting bias 
would be downward. 
 
7. Extensions 
7.1 Socio-Economic Results for Children 
If family planning affects the number and timing of women' s births, it may have very 
important consequences for investments that parents make in their children, too.  Because the 
Colombian population censuses do not completely specify intra-household relationships, 
however, I am unable to match many children to their biological mothers and therefore cannot 
directly estimate program effects on the children of women with differential family planning 
access.  Instead, I construct “statistical mothers” for children using the mean characteristics of 
women who ever had children and were fertile in each child’s municipality and year of birth.  I 
match these characteristics to children and assign age-specific family planning access according 
to statistical mother' s age and municipality of residence.  This statistical mother approach 
reduces the variation in program exposure that I am able to exploit considerably; the resulting 
estimates should only be interpreted as suggestive.
25 
                                                 
25 This approach also requires that family planning access be unrelated to the distribution of maternal characteristics 
at the age by municipality level.  I find no evidence of any relationship.   25 
The relationship between women' s access to family planning and child outcomes is 
estimated by the general equation: 
(5)  iym ym ym m y m
a
aym a iym g x y s c e l p d d d b a + + + ´ + + + + = ￿ . 
Child outcomes (c) include whether or not a child is attending school, years of educational 
attainment, and whether or not a child is working in the formal sector.  The age interval in which 
family planning first became available to statistical mothers (s) is coded as before, and statistical 
mother age (x) and probability of having migrated in her lifetime (g) are controlled for as well.  
To investigate intra-household differences in the distribution of family planning benefits by 
children’s gender, I estimate equation 5 for boys and girls both separately and together in a 
pooled sample.  Analyses are restricted to children ages 10-14 in 1993 because it is not possible 
to condition on a girl’s own age-specific access to family planning when estimating the effect of 
statistical mothers’ family planning access (both are a function of a child’s age and 
municipality). 
Table 8 shows estimates for children’s socio-economic status obtained from equation 5.  
Dependent variables are shown at the top of each column; rows correspond to different samples 
(boys and girls together, boys only, and girls only).  Each cell presents results for statistical 
mother family planning access at all fertile ages (beginning at ages 15-19) relative to no access at 
any fertile age.  Estimates in the first row suggest that the children of women with lifetime access 
to family planning were two percentage points more likely to be attending school, had received 
0.08 more years of education, and were less likely to be working in the formal sector.  Broken 
down by gender, the second and third rows together suggest that boys enjoyed these benefits 
disproportionately more than girls.  Girls possibly gained some additional schooling and were   26 
less likely to become teenage mothers, but boys enjoyed nearly all of the gains in school 
attendance and reductions in child labor. 
On the whole, Table 8 provides suggestive evidence that family planning played an 
important role in reducing the intergenerational transmission of poverty.  However, there were 
striking gender disparities in distribution of these benefits.  These disparities are consistent with 
the literature on gender bias in household resource allocation (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982, 
Sen 1992, Thomas 1994, Duflo 2003).  They may also reflect changes in the sex composition of 
children under family planning.  If modern contraceptives allowed parents to adhere more 
closely to fertility rules based on male preference, girls'  outcomes may be relatively worse 
because they would tend to be in larger families.
26 
 
7.2 Family Planning and Inequality 
In addition to improving average levels of well-being, contraceptive access may have 
important consequences for socio-economic inequality.  Because better educated women have 
larger opportunity costs of time and stronger incentives to limit their fertility (Chen and Kremer 
2002), it could increase inequality.  There may also be diminishing returns to averted births, so 
fertility reductions at lower levels might produce larger benefits.  Alternatively, less educated 
women may face larger costs of fertility control in the absence of modern contraceptives (if they 
are less empowered, for example).  In this case, they might benefit more from family planning, 
and socio-economic inequality would fall. 
                                                 
26 There is evidence of such rules in other settings (Park 1983, Ahn 1991) as well as anecdotal evidence from 
Colombia: “…The total number of children was related to the order in which sons and daughters were born.  
Couples continued to have children until they had enough sons to balance the financial demands of raising their 
daughters” (Ortiz 1999).   27 
Plausibly exogenous variation in education or socio-economic status is necessary to test 
this hypothesis using individual-level data.  Instead, I exploit the staggered introduction of 
PROFAMILIA’s programs by regressing the standard deviation (and log standard deviation) of 
education at the municipal level in 1993 on the number of years that family planning was 
available, controlling for municipal characteristics in 1973.
27  The results (not shown) provide 
evidence of statistically meaningful reductions in educational inequality under family planning 
(standard deviation reductions of 0.01 years of schooling per year of family planning availability, 
or about 0.3% per year).  For 25 years of program exposure, this translates into standard 
deviations that are smaller by about 0.25 years (or 7.5%).  These results are consistent with 
family planning having reduced socio-economic inequality in Colombia.  There is independent 
evidence that income inequality declined substantially in Colombia during the 1970s as 
PROFAMILIA was scaling-up its programs (Birchenall 2001). 
 
7.3 Program Costs 
In addition to the size of family planning’s benefits, a key issue is how much it costs to 
produce them.  A formal cost-benefit analysis of PROFAMILIA’s programs is not generally 
possible because many of its benefits cannot be directly estimated and valued.  Women’s 
empowerment is a good example of this.  Crude program cost and cost-effectiveness calculations 
are feasible, however.  Arguably the strongest criticism of the Matlab experiment is its 
unrealistic program expenses and its large cost-effectiveness ratio.  The Matlab family planning 
‘treatment’ cost about 10% of per capita GDP per fertile woman and about 120% of per capita 
GDP per averted birth (Pritchett 1994).  PROFAMILIA’s programs were dramatically less 
                                                 
27 These are mean age, share female, share employed in the formal sector, share cohabitating, share ever moved, and 
share moved in the last 5 years in 1973.  Although not possible, it would be preferable to control for municipal 
characteristics in 1964.   28 
expensive relative to national income (Seltzer and Gomez 1998).  Specifically, program costs 
were about 0.1% of per capita GDP per fertile woman in program municipalities (about 1/100th 
of the Matlab costs relative to income) and about 0.25% of per capita GDP per birth averted 
(about 1/500th of the Matlab costs relative to income).  These rough calculations suggest that 
family planning can be successful for considerably less than in Matlab. 
 
7.4 Comparisons with Other Interventions 
Given debate over the importance of family planning in reducing poverty and promoting 
development, informal comparisons with other development interventions are informative.  The 
results in Section 6.2 demonstrate that educational gains are a clear benefit of family planning.  
Improving education is a cornerstone of efforts to alleviate poverty, increase productivity, and 
promote economic growth in poor countries (Glewwe 2002).  Rough comparisons with other 
interventions that specifically target education therefore help to put the importance of family 
planning into context. 
One well-documented program provided school vouchers to subsidize private secondary 
school tuition in Colombia (where private education is thought to be higher-quality) (Angrist, 
Bloom, King, and Kremer 2002).  In the short-run, vouchers raised educational attainment by 0.1 
years of schooling, or about 1.5%.  Another initiative was Indonesia’s massive school 
construction program during the 1970s (Duflo 2001).  The construction of over 60,000 schools 
during a five-year period increased schooling by about 0.15 years on average, or roughly 2%.  A 
third intervention was the introduction of compulsory school attendance and child labor laws in 
the early 20th Century United States (Lleras-Muney 2002).  Taken together, these laws increased 
educational attainment by 5%, or around half a year.  Finally, a study of school resources and   29 
education among blacks under South Africa’s apartheid-era government suggests that reducing 
class size by one-quarter would increase schooling by half a year, or about 6% (Case and Deaton 
1999).  PROFAMILIA’s programs increased women’s education by an amount roughly 
equivalent to some these initiatives that specifically targeted education (about 0.14 years, or 
more than 2%).  In other words, its education benefits alone place it among some of the most 
highly-regarded development initiatives. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In light of the ongoing debate about family planning’s ability to reduce fertility in 
developing countries, this paper suggests that neither side is exactly right.  However, it sides 
more closely with the view that other forces (originating either on the supply- or demand-side) 
are more potent.  PROFAMILIA’s programs reduced women’s completed lifetime fertility by 
roughly half a child, but they explain only 9% to 12% of the fertility decline in program 
municipalities between 1964 and 1993 as Colombia underwent its demographic transition. 
Despite its modest role in reducing lifetime fertility, this paper also demonstrates that the 
ability of family planning to fight poverty cannot easily be dismissed.  Colombian women with 
access to modern contraceptives at young ages experienced substantial socio-economic gains.  A 
formal cost-benefit analysis of PROFAMILIA’s programs would be difficult because many of its 
benefits are hard to value.  However, the gains in education alone attributable to family planning 
place it among some of the best-regarded education interventions.  Given that 350 million 
couples worldwide presently lack access to family planning services (United Nations Population 
Fund, 2004), family planning may deserve more attention in dialogue surrounding the 
Millennium Development Goals and poverty relief in general.   30 
The age pattern of results suggests that family planning most likely generated socio-
economic benefits by allowing young women to postpone their first birth.  This finding implies 
that the development literature’s focus on completed lifetime fertility and child quantity 
overlooks a critical dimension of fertility emphasized by wealthy country studies – the lifecycle 
timing of births (and first births in particular) (Ribar 1999, Goldin and Katz 2002, Bailey 2006).  
It also suggests that Latin America’s contemporary increases in teenage motherhood may have 
more detrimental consequences than is presently recognized (Florez and Nuñez 2002). 
Finally, this paper’s major findings imply that fertility control can be quite costly in the 
absence of modern contraceptives.  Significant dimensions of these costs may include forgoing 
desired sexual activity and women with relatively little bargaining power negotiating sexual 
behavior and fertility with men.  Because the costs of fertility control in developing countries are 
poorly understood, this is an important topic for further research.  Policies that aim to help 
women achieve their desired level of fertility or to improve economic and social conditions 
generally may do well to emphasize reducing the costs of fertility control beyond what family 
planning achieves.   31 
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yTable 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics, 1973 and 1993 Colombian Population Censuses
1973 Census
Total Total Never-Movers
Age 32.92 51.38 50.81
(12.39) (11.38) (11.33)
Number of Children Ever Born 3.87 5.07 5.18
(2.78) (3.24) (3.26)
Proportion of Children Dead if Ever Have Children 0.10 0.06 0.06
(0.19) (0.15) (0.15)
Years of Education N/A 5.29 5.32
(3.43) (3.49)
Share Ever Having Children 0.65 0.88 0.86
Share Cohabitating 0.56 0.32 0.30
Share Employed in the Formal Sector 0.50 0.53 0.53
Share Always Living in Same Municipality 0.73 0.60 ---
Share Moved in Past Five Years 0.20 0.15 ---
Note: Standard deviations shown in parentheses
1993 CensusTable 2: Estimated Program Effects on Completed Lifetime Fertility Among Women Ever Having Children
Dependent Variable:
Cohort Only All Covariates Cohort Only All Covariates





(0.012) (0.027) (0.004) (0.012)





(0.018) (0.022) (0.009) (0.013)
Family Planning Access 25-29 -0.054***
B -0.062*** -0.028** -0.038***
B
(0.016) (0.025) (0.011) (0.010)
Family Planning Access 30-34 -0.030***
B -0.042***
B -0.015* -0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Family Planning Access 35-39 -0.021 -0.014 -0.011 -0.001
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023) (0.017)
Family Planning Access 40-44 -0.030 -0.033 -0.029 -0.002
(0.034) (0.048) (0.045) (0.036)
Family Planning Access 45-49 -0.009 0.001 0.007 0.004
(0.013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004)
Cohort Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed-Effects No Yes No Yes
Municipality-Specific Linear Trends No Yes No Yes
N 678,387 678,387 678,387 678,387
R
2 0.40 0.40 ------- -------
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level shown in parentheses. "Cohort Only" specifications include 
birth cohort dummy variables; "All Covariates" include migration history, municipality dummies, cohort dummies, and 
municipality-specific linear time trends. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
BSignificant (￿=0.05) after a mutiple comparison 
correction (the Bonferroni multiple comparison correction for six tests of significance requires a significance threshold 
of ￿=0.0085 for each test to recover an overall significance level of ￿=0.05).
ln(Births)￿Any Birth Births￿Any Birth (NB2)Table 3: Estimated Program Effects on Probability of Ever Having a Child
Dependent Variable:
Cohort Only, 1993 Census All Covariates, 1993 Census All Covariates, 1973 Census
Family Planning Access 15-19 0.007 -0.001 -0.028***
B
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Family Planning Access 20-24 -0.005 0.009 -0.011*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Family Planning Access 25-29 -0.002 0.002 -0.004
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
Family Planning Access 30-34 -0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Family Planning Access 35-39 0.007 -0.009 -0.021
(0.004) (0.007) (0.019)
Family Planning Access 40-44 -0.011 0.017 -0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.003)
Family Planning Access 45-49 -0.012 -0.008 -0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
Cohort Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes
Municipality Fixed-Effects No Yes Yes
Municipality-Specific Linear Trends No Yes Yes
N 1,064,874 1,064,874 798,392
R
2 0.70 0.80 0.80
Notes: The results shown are marginal probabilities obtained from probit models calculated at the mean of the independent variables.  Standard errors 
clustered at the municipality level shown in parentheses. "Cohort Only" specifications include birth cohort dummy variables. "All Covariates" include 
migration history, municipality dummies, cohort dummies, and municipality-specific linear time trends. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
 BSignificant (￿=0.05) 
after a mutiple comparison correction (the Bonferroni multiple comparison correction for six tests of significance requires a significance threshold of 
￿=0.0085 for each test to recover an overall significance level of ￿=0.05).
Any BirthTable 4: Estimated Program Effects on Socio-Economic Status Among Women Ever Having a Child
Dependent Variable: Years of Education Work in Formal Sector "White-Collar" Job Cohabitate Share of Children Dead
Family Planning Access 15-19 0.142***
B 0.027***
B 0.019 -0.023** -0.002
(0.048) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011) (0.002)
Family Planning Access 20-24 0.067** 0.033***
B 0.009 -0.021***
B 0.001
(0.031) (0.009) (0.013) (0.004) (0.003)
Family Planning Access 25-29 0.097 0.006 0.002 -0.008 0.003*
(0.078) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002)
Family Planning Access 30-34 -0.012 0.009 -0.008 -0.014** -0.002
(0.083) (0.011) (0.016) (0.007) (0.003)
Family Planning Access 35-39 -0.026 -0.005 -0.013 0.010 -0.003
(0.033) (0.014) (0.016) (0.008) (0.002)
Family Planning Access 40-44 -0.011 -0.012 0.049 0.004 0.004
(0.064) (0.012) (0.037) (0.021) (0.004)
Family Planning Access 45-49 -0.016 0.011 -0.004 0.004 -0.002
(0.048) (0.019) (0.032) (0.014) (0.003)
N 669,446 631,784 169,285 643,854 624,399
R
2 0.23 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.07
Notes: The results shown for Work in Formal Sector, "White-Collar" Job, and Cohabitate are marginal probabilities obtained from probit models calculated at the mean of the independent 
variables. All specifications include migration history, municipality dummies, cohort dummies, and municipality-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level shown 
in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
BSignificant (￿=0.05) after a mutiple comparison correction (the Bonferroni multiple comparison correction for six tests of significance requires a 
significance threshold of ￿=0.0085 for each test to recover an overall significance level of ￿=0.05).Table 5: Estimated Pre-Program Effects on Various Outcomes
Estimate
§ Std Err N R
2
Dependent Variable
Any Birth (1993 Census) 0.004 (0.004) 121,738 0.26
Number of Children if Any Birth (1993 Census) 0.010 (0.010) 104,413 0.08
Share of Children Dead if Any Birth (1993 Census) 0.124 (0.234) 104,413 0.01
Years of Education (1993 Census) 0.026 (0.027) 104,413 0.18
Cohabitate (1993 Census) 0.002 (0.006) 104,413 0.08
Work in the Formal Sector (1993 Census) -0.003 (0.004) 104,413 0.07
"White-Collar" Job if Work in Formal Sector (1993 Census) 0.011 (0.034) 36,458 0.20
Any Birth (1973 Census) -0.001 (0.003) 142,937 0.21
Number of Children if Any Birth (1973 Census) 0.004 (0.005) 128,294 0.09
Share of Children Dead if Any Birth (1973 Census) 0.001 (0.002) 128,294 0.04
Cohabitate (1973 Census) 0.002 (0.004) 128,294 0.09
Work in the Formal Sector (1973 Census) 0.003 (0.003) 128,294 0.08
Notes: The results shown for Any Birth, Cohabitate, Work in Formal Sector, and "White-Collar" Job are marginal 
probabilities obtained from probit models calculated at the mean of the independent variables. All specifications include 
migration history, municipality dummies, cohort dummies, and municipality-specific linear time trends. Census year 
(1973 or 1993) shown in parentheses next to each dependent variable. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level 
shown in parentheses. 
§Estimates are for those 45-49 when family planning programs began (relative to those 50-54) 
except for years of education, which is for those 25-29 when programs began (relative to those 30-34). *p<0.1, **p<0.05, 
***p<0.01.Table 6: Estimated Program Effects on Socio-Economic Status Among Women Never Having a Child 
Dependent Variable: Years of Education Work in Formal Sector "White-Collar" Job Cohabitate
Family Planning Access 15-19 0.046 0.010 0.005 -0.002
(0.167) (0.014) (0.029) (0.010)
Family Planning Access 20-24 -0.071 -0.010 0.037 -0.016
(0.144) (0.017) (0.031) (0.013)
Family Planning Access 25-29 -0.306 0.007 0.046 0.012
(0.182) (0.028) (0.067) (0.020)
Family Planning Access 30-34 0.309 0.006 -0.008 0.018
(0.230) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017)
Family Planning Access 35-39 -0.050 -0.004 -0.024 -0.021
(0.034) (0.010) (0.079) (0.021)
Family Planning Access 40-44 -0.010 -0.012 0.139 -0.003
(0.092) (0.045) (0.136) (0.036)
Family Planning Access 45-49 0.025 -0.026 -0.002 -0.050
(0.068) (0.041) (0.120) (0.031)
N 191,433 186,829 47,128 188,763
R
2 0.67 0.15 0.08 0.07
Notes: The results shown for Work in Formal Sector, "White-Collar" Job, and Cohabitate are marginal probabilities obtained from probit models 
calculated at the mean of the independent variables. All specifications include migration history, municipality dummies, cohort dummies, and 
municipality-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level shown in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.Table 7: Estimated Program Effects on Fertility and Socioeconomic Outcomes Among Never-Movers
Dependent Variable: ln(Births)￿Any Birth Births￿Any Birth (NB) Any Birth Years of Education Work in Formal Sector "White-Collar" Job Cohabitate






(0.026) (0.016) (0.005) (0.036) (0.005) (0.017) (0.009)
Family Planning Access 20-24 -0.076***
B -0.043***
B 0.012 0.058** 0.037***
B -0.005 -0.020**
(0.019) (0.013) (0.008) (0.024) (0.010) (0.021) (0.009)
Family Planning Access 25-29 -0.041*** -0.031** 0.008 0.038 -0.007 0.000 -0.015
(0.013) (0.014) (0.006) (0.035) (0.010) (0.023) (0.011)
Family Planning Access 30-34 -0.032 0.002 0.006 0.016 -0.018 0.006 0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.006) (0.024) (0.012) (0.028) (0.009)
Family Planning Access 35-39 0.018 0.015 0.004 -0.043 -0.020 0.026 -0.005
(0.024) (0.019) (0.008) (0.057) (0.016) (0.049) (0.012)
Family Planning Access 40-44 -0.028 -0.009 0.017 -0.031 -0.028 0.002 0.014
(0.039) (0.007) (0.014) (0.093) (0.026) (0.008) (0.033)
Family Planning Access 45-49 0.042 -0.012 0.015 0.026 -0.020 0.009 0.008
(0.035) (0.021) (0.012) (0.025) (0.021) (0.009) (0.019)
N 413,833 413,833 651,184 409,217 386,474 112,377 394,756
R
2 0.41 ------- 0.82 0.26 0.13 0.05 0.08
Notes: The results shown for Any Birth, Cohabitate, Work in Formal Sector, and "White-Collar" Job are marginal probabilities obtained from probit models calculated at the mean of the independent variables. All specifications include 
migration history, municipality dummies, cohort dummies, and municipality-specific linear time trends. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level shown in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
BSignificant (￿=0.05) after a 
mutiple comparison correction (the Bonferroni multiple comparison correction for six tests of significance requires a significance threshold of ￿=0.0085 for each test to recover an overall significance level of ￿=0.05).Table 8: Estimated Effects of Mother's Lifetime Family Planning Access on Child Socio-Economic Status 
Dependent Variable: Attending School Work in Formal Sector Years of Education
Mother's Access 15-19 (Boys and Girls) 0.019*** -0.016** 0.077***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.021)
Mother's Access 15-19 (Boys Only) 0.033*** -0.091*** 0.090***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.029)
Mother's Access 15-19 (Girls Only) 0.007 0.047** 0.066**
(0.006) (0.021) (0.031)
Notes: Each cell is obtained from a different regression and shows an estimate for statistical mother family planning access beginning at 
ages 15-19 (relative to no access at reproductive ages). The results shown for Attending School and Work in Formal Sector are marginal 
probabilities obtained from probit models calculated at the mean of the independent variables. All specifications also include statistical 
mother's age, statistical mother's migration history, municipality dummies, cohort dummies, and municipality-specific linear trends. 
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.